Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 05940 01 OF 03 191918Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
INRE-00 ICAE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NASA-01
NEA-10 NSAE-00 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 DOE-15 CEQ-01
OES-07 SS-15 /143 W
----------084773 191937Z /53
O 191756Z APR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8611
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 05940

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR WARNKE
USUN NEW YORK FOR AMBASSADOR FISHER

E.O.11652:GDS
TAGS: PARM US UR
SUBJECT: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ROUND SEVEN, 15TH PLENARY MEETING, APRIL 18, 1978

REF: GENEVA 5590

CW MESSAGE NO.44

1. SUMMARY: THE FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS WAS HELD TUESDAY, APRIL 18. AMB LIKHATCHEV (HEAD OF SOVIET DEL) MADE A STATEMENT ON ISSUES RELATED TO VERIFICATION, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE VARIOUS DECLARATIONS WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED UNDER THE CONVENTION AND WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION. THE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION WERE ACCEPTANCE OF THE US-PROPOSED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 05940 01 OF 03 191918Z

TIME-LIMIT FOR DECLARATIONS OF STOCKS; AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO ESTABLISH, FOR REPORTING PURPOSES, A LIST OF IMPORTANT LETHAL COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS; WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE IN THE CONVENTION THAT REASONS FOR ANY REFUSAL OF CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION MUST BE SUFFI-CIENTLY CONVINCING; AND AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A PREPARATORY COMMISSION UPON SIGNATURE OF THE CONVEN-

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

TION. LIKHATCHEV ALSO INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE OF A CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF GENERAL INFORMATION ON STOCKS AT A LATER STAGE, "IN CONNECTION WITH THE MATTER OF RATIFICATION." IN ADDITION, HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STUDYING CAREFULLY THE US PROPOSAL FOR DESTROYING STOCKS AT SPECIALLY DESIGNATED FACILITIES. AS TO DECLARATION OF FACILITIES, LIKHATCHEV REAFFIRMED SOVIET REJECTION OF THE US APPROACH, CLAIMING AGAIN THAT DECLARATION OF "FACILITIES" AND OF PLANS FOR THEIR ELIMINATION WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. IN AN EXCHANGE FOLLOWING LIKHATCHEV'S STATEMENT, AKALOVSKY (ACTING HEAD OF US DEL) REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF ANY SOVIET MOVEMENT ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF REQUIRED ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS AND OF THE DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES. LIKHATCHEV REITERATED SOVIET CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF SUCH VERIFICATION, ASSERTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE THEIR SHARE OF CONCESSIONS AND THAT THE US SHOULD NOW RECIPROCATE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN HIS STATEMENT, SOVIET AMB LIKHATCHEV MADE THE FOLLOWING SALIENT POINTS:

A. VERIFICATION SYSTEM. LIKHATCHEV SAID THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD BE COMPRISED OF THREE ELEMENTS: INTERNAL OR NATIONAL MEANS, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND INTER-
CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES OF NATIONAL CONTROL (AS PROVIDED FOR IN AN ANNEX TO THEIR DRAFT CONVENTION) AND NATIONAL CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE VARIOUS STATES PARTIES AND THEIR COOPERATION WITH THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT ORGANIC LINK BETWEEN THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM, THUS ENHANCING THE ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF VERIFICATION.

B. DECLARATIONS. LIKHATCHEV STATED THAT DECLARATIONS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION.

-- DECLARATIONS OF STOCKS. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THE US PROPOSAL TO HAVE DECLARATIONS OF VOLUMES OF STOCKS THIRTY DAYS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION BUT SAID THE DETAILED CONTENT OF SUCH DECLARATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- DECLARATIONS OF "CAPABILITIES". LIKHATCHEV REITERATED SOVIET READINESS TO DECLARE "CAPABILITIES" AND PLANS FOR THEIR ELIMINATION/DISMANTLING. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

PROPOSED DECLARATIONS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INFOR-
MATION CONTAINED IN THE LISTS AND OTHER DECLARATIONS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONVENTION, WERE FULLY ADEQUATE TO
ENSURE COMPLIANCE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SOLVED THE
PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE, UNRELATED
INFORMATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, LIKHATCHEV STATED
THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE US PROPOSAL TO DECLARE
LOCATIONS AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION ON CW PRODUCTION
FACILITIES REMAINED UNCHANGED. CLAIMING THE SOVIETS HAD
MADE A NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS TO THE US ON VERIFICATION
AND OTHER MAJOR ISSUES, HE ASSERTED THAT ON THIS
PARTICULAR ISSUE THE US SHOULD BE THE ONE TO MAKE CON-
CESSIONS AND REVIEW ITS POSITION.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 05940 02 OF 03 191926Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NASA-01
NEA-10 NSAE-00 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 DOE-15 CEQ-01
OES-07 SS-15 /143 W
----------084843 191937Z /53
O 191756Z APR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8612
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 05940

MOSCOW FOR AMB. WARNKE
USUN FOR AMB. FISHER

CW MESSAGE NO. 44

-- LIKHATCHEV ALSO STATED THAT THE US DEL COULD EXPECT
PRODUCTIVE WORK IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE CONTENT OF
PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS AND ELIMINATION OF
PRODUCTION "CAPABILITIES"; SUCH DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, WAS
PREMATURE AT THIS TIME AND COULD TAKE PLACE "AFTER
AGREEMENT ON QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN REACHED."

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

-- BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON STOCKS. IN A RATHER DELPHIC STATEMENT, LIKHATCHEV SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF A CONFIDENTIAL, BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF GENERAL INFORMATION ON STOCKS "SUBSEQUENTLY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 05940 02 OF 03 191926Z

C. LISTS OF "IMPORTANT" LETHAL AND OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS AND "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS. SOVIETS AGREED TO THE US PROPOSAL TO DRAW UP LISTS OF "IMPORTANT" LETHAL AND OTHER HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS AND REAFFIRMED AGREEMENT WITH US PROPOSAL TO DRAW UP LIST OF "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES BUT WHICH COULD BE DIVERTED TO MILITARY USE. LIKHATCHEV SAID THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE LISTS WOULD BE WORKED OUT BILATERALLY LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. CERTAIN INFORMATION ON PRECURSORS COULD THEN, ON THE BASIS OF THE LIST OF "IMPORTANT" PRECURSORS, BE EXCHANGED BILATERALLY OR THROUGH THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE.

D. NON-TRANSFER. LIKHATCHEV ASKED IF US POSITION ON NON-TRANSFER COINCIDED WITH THE SOVIET POSITION AS SET FORTH IN SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE III.

E. CW STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION FACILITY. LIKHATCHEV SAID SOVIETS WERE STUDYING THE US PROPOSAL THAT SPECIALIZED FACILITIES BE SET UP FOR DESTRUCTION OF CW STOCKS.

F. CEILING ON SUPER-TOXIC CHEMICALS. LIKHATCHEV SAID SOVIETS WERE STUDYING THE DETAILED US APPROACH TO THE MAXIMUM PERMITTED QUANTITY OF SUPER-TOXIC CHEMICALS TO BE RETAINED FOR NON-HOSTILE MILITARY PURPOSES (SEE GENEVA 5590, PARA 2A). REGARDING ALL OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS, IN THE LOWER TOXICITY RANGE, HE SAID VERIFICATION WOULD BE ASSURED THROUGH THE VARIOUS DECLARATIONS REQUIRED UNDER THE CONVENTION, LISTS, AND STATISTICAL CONTROLS; HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OF HSE MANY-FACETTED MEASURES AT THIS TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 05940 02 OF 03 191926Z

G. CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. WITH REFERENCE TO THE US PROPOSAL THAT THE CONVENTION PROVIDE FOR SUB-

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

MISSION OF ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION OF ANY REFUSAL OF A CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION, LIKHATCHEV STATED THAT THE SOVIET DEL HAD ALWAYS HELD THAT A REFUSAL FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD NOT AFFECT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION IF SUCH A REFUSAL WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A CONVINCING EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THE REQUEST WAS DEEMED UNFOUNDED. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOW AGREE THAT EXPLANATION OF A REFUSAL SHOULD BE "SUFFICIENTLY CONVINCING" AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY REFLECTED IN THE CONVENTION.

H. PREPARATORY COMMISSION. SOVIET DEL AGREED TO THE CREATION OF A PREPARATORY COMMISSION AND PROPOSED THAT SUCH A COMMISSION BE FORMED UPON SIGNATURE OF THE CONVENTION SO THAT THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE COULD BEGIN FUNCTIONING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION.

3. AKALOVSKY (ACTING HEAD OF US DEL) SAID THE US DEL WOULD STUDY THE SOVIET STATEMENT CAREFULLY, BUT NOTED WITH REGRET THE ABSENCE OF ANY SOVIET MOVEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF REQUIRED ON-SITE VERIFICATION, TO WHICH THE US ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE. LIKHATCHEV REJOINED THAT THE SOVIET DEL HAD ALREADY MADE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, MANY OF WHICH RELATED TO VERIFICATION. HE CLAIMED THE US WAS SPECIALLY EMPHASIZING ONLY ONE PART OF THE COMPLEX OF VERIFICATION MEASURES, MEASURES WHICH COULD LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF COMMERCIAL SECRETS AND SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION. HE CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH MEASURES, MAINTAINING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM PROPOSED BY THE USSR WAS COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT. HE ASKED THAT THE US TAKE A BROADER APPROACH TO VERIFICATION AND ASSERTED THE SOVIET
CONFIDENTIAL

SIDE HAD "TRAVELLED ITS PART OF THE WAY" TO MEET THE US. "ON THIS QUESTION, THEREFORE,"HE SAID, "WE WOULD LIKE RECIPROCITY." AKALOVSKY SAID HE BELIEVED BOTH SIDES HAD MADE CONCESSIONS IN THE TALKS THUS FAR. WHILE IT WAS TRUE

NNN

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NASA-01
NEA-10 NSAE-00 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 DOE-15 CEQ-01
OES-07 SS-15 /143 W
----------084863 191936Z /53
O 191756Z APR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8613
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 05940

MOSCOW FOR AMB. WARNKE

USUN FOR AMB. FISHER

CW MESSAGE NO. 44

THAT THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM MUST BE ASSESSED IN ITS TOTALITY, THE FACT WAS THAT, IN THE US VIEW, THE SOVIET POSITION ON VERIFICATION LEFT A SIGNIFICANT GAP IN THAT SYSTEM. NOTING THAT THE US ALSO DID NOT WISH ON-SITE INSPECTIONS TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF UNRELATED INFORMATION, AKALOVSKY POINTED OUT THAT US PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THAT FOR SPECIALIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITIES, WERE DESIGNED TO AVOID SUCH DISCLOSURE. HE CONCLUDED BY RECALLING US WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON THIS ISSUE, AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF IT WOULD BE FOUND IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

4. AT AMB LIKHATCHEV'S SUGGESTION, WHO SAID THAT HIS DEL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HAD NO ADDITIONAL MATERIAL TO PRESENT, THE DATE OF THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING WAS LEFT OPEN, BUT A DRAFTING GROUP MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 20.

5. IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH AKALOVSKY, LIKHATCHEV EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE CURRENT CW ROUND COULD BE TERMINATED DURING WEEK OF APRIL 24-28, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CW INFORMALS IN CCD. HE THOUGHT THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE ROUND SHOULD NOT CONTINUE BEYOND

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

MAY 3-4. AKALOVSKY SUGGESTED THAT THIS MATTER BE FURTHER
DISCUSSED AFTER AMB FISHER'S RETURN TO GENEVA APRIL 23.
VANDEN HEUVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CHEMICAL WARFARE, NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA05940
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780168-0137
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780441/aaaabiny.tel
Line Count: 335
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a4908bab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 GENEVA 5590
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2922796
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ROUND SEVEN, 15TH PLENARY MEETING, APRIL 18, 1978
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a4908bab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014